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Summary 
Corruption through opaque public contracts costs Africa billions of dollars in revenue loss 
annually. Globally, initiatives to address this have centred on information disclosure (ID) but 
under what conditions does it work to promote accountability in the extractive sector that for 
a long time has seen its revenue management as being a major cause of conflict in Africa? 
Our study on this issue in Mozambique reveals intriguing findings, which suggest that 
protagonists of ID would need to recalibrate their strategies for promoting accountability. The 
study on ID in extractive governance in Mozambique has found 17 factors that connect to 
result in citizen and institutional inaction in demanding government accountability. The 
lesson from the study for policy and practice are that unless there is a link between ID and a 
government’s reputation, which scales up to the risk of a ruling government losing power, 
accountability is unlikely to occur when new information is disclosed.  
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1  Introduction 
The literature is replete with presumptions that an institutional environment that is 
characterised by openness and transparency contributes to better development outcomes 
(Geginat 2012; Hameed 2005; Kaufmann et al. 2009; World Bank 2016). Nevertheless, for a 
very long time, governments and corporations in resource rich but economically poor 
countries have developed opaque business environments in the extractive industry. They do 
so deliberately in order to take advantage of the sector’s wealth and undermine incentives 
for promoting accountability in its use (Africa Progress Panel 2013). The Resource 
Governance Index (NRI)1 shows that among the 81 countries of the world's top producers of 
petroleum, gas and copper, only 19 (23 per cent) show good or satisfactory governance 
(NRGI 2017); that is, having laws and practices that are reasonably likely to result in 
extractive resource wealth benefiting citizens. The 2017 NRGI shows that the only African 
countries classified as good or satisfactory are Ghana (for oil and gas) and Botswana (for 
mining). The remaining African countries have either weak, poor or failing governance 
standards. Transparency and control of corruption are components of the index that the 
overwhelming majority of African countries either failed or scored poorly. In the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, shady contracts in the mining sector were estimated to be worth 
US$1.36 billion in the two years from 2010 to 2012 (Africa Progress Panel 2013: 56). In 
2010, Global Witness reported that the Government of Uganda received US$500,000 from 
the extractive sector but the transfer could not be traced to any government accounts 
(Global Witness 2010: 12).  
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global initiative that emanated 
from the need to promote transparency in the sector. Established in 2002, the EITI brings 
together a coalition of governments, companies, and civil society organisations (CSOs) in 
cooperation to ensure that member countries govern and manage their extractive industries 
to open and transparent standards. Currently 51 countries constitute its membership. The 
key objective of the EITI is to ensure that extractive companies commit to disclosing 
information with regards to their payments to governments so citizens and pro-accountability 
institutions can use that information to hold governments and private corporations to account 
(EITI 2017). In the last decade, the EITI has received international recognition as setting the 
standard for transparency in a sector whose revenue management, for a long time, has been 
opaque, inaccessible, and unpublished, and a major cause of conflict and political instability 
in many countries (Haufler 2010).  
 
A number of assumptions are made with regards to information disclosure (ID) and the 
pathways towards accountability and development in extractive governance: 
 
1. Participation of multi-stakeholder groups (MSG), including CSOs, in extractive 
governance will get new information out to the public in ways that the government and 
the private corporations would have no incentives to disclose.  
2. Citizens and pro-accountability institutions (parliament, revenue authorities, law 
enforcement agencies, the media, CSOs, etc.) armed with new information will be 
empowered to take social and political action (SPA) to demand accountability from 
government (EITI 2011; 2017). The SPA may include civil and uncivil protest, 
demonstrations, further investigation, public debate, court action, and campaigns by 
interest groups. Public protest and further investigations will stimulate policy debate 
that leads to enforcement and/or legislative review that results in the return of any 
                                                          
1  The NRGI measures the level of transparency and accountability in the oil, gas and mining sectors in 81 countries that 
together produce, among other commodities, 82 per cent of the world’s oil, 78 per cent of its gas and 72 per cent of all 
copper. 
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stolen extractive revenue and imprisonment of corrupt public officials and their 
associates. 
3. As pro-accountability institutions openly access EITI reports and use them to enrich 
public awareness and debate, ID would open the government’s decision making to 
further public scrutiny. Knowing that they are being monitored and the potential 
consequences arising from such scrutiny; both governments and corporations would 
avoid clandestine behaviour.  
4. Through MSG participation at the national level, a platform for dialogue, cooperation, 
social responsibility, and peer pressure is created that promotes accountability in 
extractive governance (Aaronsen and Brinkerhoff 2011). The NRGI argues that by 
having access to signed contracts, information asymmetry that normally favours the 
government and corporations is eliminated; hence strengthening the negotiation of 
CSOs and affected mining communities (RWI 2009). When citizens from poor mining 
communities are informed about the revenue coming from the exploitation of natural 
resources, and how such revenue could improve their living conditions, they are 
empowered to demand their fair share; hence social accountability mechanisms begin 
to be set in motion (Vijge 2018).  
5. Another path to accountability and development is that MSG dialogue will result in 
mutual understanding, appreciation and consensus among government, private 
companies and CSOs leading to improved governance without the need for SPA. For 
instance with greater ID, governments are able to negotiate better and fairer deals with 
extractive companies. The government’s participation also gives it some credibility, as 
greater transparency reduces political and investment risks for investors (EITI 2014). 
 
These micro-level governance fixes in the long run are expected to bubble up to improve 
overall governance and developmental outcomes in participating countries (McDevitt 2017). 
These are the basis of EITI’s theory of change (see Figure 1). But this study questions these 
presumptions in the context of Mozambique. 
 
Figure 1.1 EITI theory of change  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ construct based on available literature. 
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In 2009, the Government of Mozambique (GoM) voluntarily joined the EITI, opening the door 
for MSGs’ participation in extractive governance. Since then, the EITI has issued six major 
extractive governance reports; previously information on the extractive industry had been a 
closely guarded secret. In 2013, Mozambique received a ‘failing’ composite score of 37 per 
cent in the Resource Governance Index but by 2017 it had improved to 50 per cent (NRGI 
2017). In 2016, four organisations represented civil society within the MSG.2 With the 
exception of the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP)3 that focuses solely on anti-corruption, the 
rest are multi-tasked – environmental, participatory governance, land rights advocates, etc. 
In general, the CIP has been at the forefront in the campaign against corruption in 
Mozambique (CIP 2014: 9).  
 
Since becoming a member of the MSG in 2013, the CIP has led a campaign to make ID a 
public discourse, with the aim of empowering citizens to claim their rights and for pro-
accountability institutions to enforce rules of accountability. International development 
agencies (Sida, DANIDA, World Bank, DFID, NORAD, and Dutch Development 
Cooperation) are supporting transparency initiatives that CIP, Mozambique EITI (MEITI) and 
other CSOs are pursuing in the country with an understanding that ID would promote 
empowerment and accountability. CIP believes that through investigations of public interest 
issues on extractives, and dissemination of information arising from such analysis, an 
informed public debate will arise in Maputo and in the provinces, leading to SPA for policy 
changes, strengthening of mining laws and subsequently, an inclusive economic growth for 
all Mozambicans (CIP 2014: 19). The CIP’s theory of change is premised on the 
understanding that public officials are afraid of being exposed. 
 
Our first priority in the extractive sector has always been to expose corrupt contracts 
because we are aware that ruling elites are interested in extracting economic rents 
using their positions and access to confidential information. It is our objective to 
expose conflict of interest by ‘naming and shaming’ these public officials.  
(Interview with a founding member of CIP in Maputo, August 2017).  
 
After ‘naming and shaming’, the expectation of CIP is that state public accountability 
institutions would act on the available information to further investigate and punish corrupt 
public officials. Through its participation in the MSG meetings and private investigations on 
government contracts, the CIP has held a series of press conferences, seminars and 
meetings to provide information to the general public and specific state institutions on issues 
that it regards as public interest. CIP has analysed government contracts with private 
corporations, drawn implications to public revenue and exposed some of the corrupt deals. 
In the area of empowerment, CIP has provided training to Members of Parliament (MPs) to 
improve their capacity to debate, approve laws and hold the government accountable in the 
extractive sector. It has also provided training to parliamentary committees and provincial 
assemblies where natural resources are extracted. CIP has also teamed up with 
international CSOs to organise workshops at home and abroad, with the aim of making 
transparency in the extractive industry part of the Mozambican public discourse.  
 
While participating in the EITI seems to have empowered CIP, its pro-accountability crusade 
sounds like ‘one hand clapping’ – not loud enough to trigger citizens and pro-accountability 
institutions to take SPA to demand government accountability. In general, there is little 
evidence to suggest that ID by EITI, CIP or any of the members of the MSG is empowering 
citizens and pro-accountability institutions to demand accountability. If ID has not been 
enough to trigger SPA, what could be the reason? To what extent is Mozambique’s political 
economy, social and cultural context an important explanation of this outcome? If information 
                                                          
2  CIP, Kuwuka JDA, Centro Terra Viva and Ruth Rede Uthende. 
3  CIP also represents the global campaign ‘Publish What You Pay’. 
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is not enough to trigger SPA, what else do citizens and pro-accountability institutions require 
to enable them take action? How does the role of external agencies affect the forms and 
degree of SPA and accountability? These were the questions that informed the Mozambican 
study of the Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) project.4 
 
 
2 Political economy context of ID in the 
extractive sector 
2.1 Political economy of natural resource extraction in Mozambique 
Mozambique is rich in natural resources. Recent projections indicate that in a few years, the 
country could become the third largest global exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) with the 
potential to turn around the country’s economy (IMF 2014). Some even project Mozambique 
becoming the Qatar of Africa (Calcuttawala 2017). Analysts expect that Mozambique will 
receive US$115 billion in revenue from LNG exports between 2020 and 2040 if the proposed 
investment in Cabo Delgado is completed (IEA 2014). In 2014, production at the Pande 
Temane gas field was worth US$100 million while the total value of coal was roughly 
US$330 million (EITI 2017: 13). The coal deposit at Moatize Basin in Tete Province is 
estimated at about 23 billion metric tonnes (Gerety 2013), and with current levels of 
production the country could export about 100 million tonnes a year to become one of the 
world’s top ten coal exporters (World Bank 2014). The Montepuez ruby deposit in Cabo 
Delgado province is said to be the largest deposit of the gemstone recently discovered in the 
world and covers an area of about 336km2.  
 
The extractive industry has spurred on foreign direct investment (FDI), reaching a peak of 
US$6.7 billion in 2013. From 2004 to 2016, FDI reached an average of about US$4 billion 
annually (World Bank 2018). The extractive industry currently comprises 30 per cent of the 
country’s exports, 3.5 per cent of GDP and 20.6 per cent of government revenue (EITI 
2017). Investments in the extractive sector have spurred the country’s two decades of 
economic growth of over 7 per cent annually; although 2016 and 2017 have seen growth 
falling below 5 per cent (World Bank n.d.). Nevertheless, the benefits of this growth are not 
widely shared across the population as national poverty has stagnated at around 50 per cent 
for over a decade (see Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Economic and welfare indicators 
Economic indicators 1996 2002 2008 2014 2016 
GDP Growth 26.8 8.7 6.8 7.4 3.8 
GNI per capita (current US$) 200 250 440 620 480 
Poverty head count ratio at national poverty lines 69.4 54.1 54.7 46.1 NA 
Poverty Head Count ratio at US$1.90 a day 85.4 80.4 68.7 NA NA 
Note: NA = not available. 
Source: World Bank Open Data 2017. 
 
Income, geographical, and gender inequalities have widened in Mozambique. The vast 
majority of the rural population still live on less than US$1.90 a day and lack basic services, 
such as access to potable water, health facilities and schools. While the country’s 20-year 
development plan is anchored in the exploitation of extractive resources, development 
                                                          
4  A4EA is an international research programme which explores how social and political action can contribute to 
empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict, and violent settings, with a particular focus on Egypt, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan.  
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partners and CSOs continue to express concerns about the governance conditions in the 
sector. This includes displacement of mining communities, lack of re-integration of revenue 
into local development, and lack of transparency around mining contracts that corporations 
have signed with the government (Gentili 2017). It is alleged that President Nyusi supported 
the revision of the Petroleum Law in 2014/15 to secure stable and favourable tax regimes for 
Anadarko and ENI. The contract guarantees a low 4 per cent production tax rate for 30 years, 
and allows a significant amount of the revenue paid to be accounted offshore (Symons 2016: 
154–7). 
 
Apart from FDIs, the GoM is also involved in the operation of the oil, gas and mining sector 
in three varied forms: (a) as a public enterprise (empresa publica) that is fully owned by the 
state and managed by the Ministry of Finance and regulated under the Public Enterprise 
Law 6/2012; (b) as state companies (Empresas da propriedade do Estado) where the state 
is the main shareholder and it is managed by the sector ministry but regulated under private 
companies law; and (c) privately created companies in which the state directly or indirectly 
holds a share (EITI 2017: 44). In 2001, the Mozambique Institute of Management of State 
Holdings (IGEPE) was created to oversee government participation and shareholding in 
private corporations. With the expansion of the government’s interest in the gas and oil 
sector through the National Hydrocarbons Enterprise (Empresa Nacional de 
Hidrocarbonetos – ENH) and its subsidiaries: ENH Logistics, Mozambican Hydrocarbon 
Company (CMH) and Mozambique Pipeline Company (CMG); the CIP, IMF and EITI have 
all expressed concern about increasing conflicts of interest and potential sources of 
corruption in the sector (EITI 2017: 44–45). They do so from hindsight of the privatisation 
experiences of the 1990s. 
 
Harrison (1999) cites a number of government ministers, a former prime minister, and family 
members of many high-ranking government officials that became owners and shareholders 
in many businesses including banking and industrial sectors because of privatisation. The 
literature on the political economy of Mozambique provides a litany of cases of public sector 
corruption (Hanlon and Smart 2013; CIP 2016; Hanlon 2017). A study by CIP shows that 
between 2002 and 2014, the Mozambican economy lost over US$4.8 billion to corruption or 
about US$400 million annually. This amount, according to CIP, was equivalent to 30 per 
cent of the country’s GDP in 2014, 60 per cent of the 2015 budget, 195 per cent of 2015 
total investment, and 362 per cent of the education budget (CIP 2016). In 2016, Western 
donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) suspended financial support to the 
government after an amount of US$2.2 billion in hidden public debt was disclosed (Kroll 
2017; Hanlon 2017). Other high-level corruption cases in recent years include overinflating 
the cost of the purchase of two Embraer aircraft from Brazil where two government officials 
received a bribe amounting to US$800,000 (O Pais 2016). Privatisation of state assets, rapid 
increases in FDIs, and the emergence of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the extractive 
industries have created rent-seeking opportunities for public office holders as they collude in 
appropriating mining concessions (CIP 2016).  
 
The context based on which public corruption thrives in Mozambique is the presence of a 
dominant political party – Frelimo – with structures that permeate all aspects of state and 
non-state institutions (Nuvunga 2014). Since 1992, Frelimo has won all democratic elections. 
MPs are appointed on an electoral system based on blocked party list.5 The dominant party 
structure makes separation of powers between the executive, judiciary and legislation 
blurred, providing the space for power and resources to be centralised in the hands of the 
same party members and sympathisers.  
 
                                                          
5  In this system, political parties make lists of candidates to be elected, and seats get distributed to each party in 
proportion to the number of votes the party receives. Voters do not directly elect the MP but a candidate is elected 
based on the order in which he/she appears on a party's list of candidates. 
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Another contributing factor to increasing levels of corruption is that the current leadership 
does not appear to have the disposition to speak openly about it, let alone the appetite to 
fight it. In contrast, the past leadership of Samora Machel frowned on corruption and 
indiscipline within the party structures and made that a central focus in a series of public 
speeches (Munslow 1985). Such speeches provided a powerful discourse from which 
corruption was discouraged, and morality and hard work became a yardstick for the party 
elite. The discourse against corruption was so strong that according to Hanlon, in 1980 
Francisco Langa, a prominent Frelimo member, committed suicide rather than face the 
shame of being seen as corrupt (Hanlon 1991: 234). 
 
2.2 Mozambique Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI) 
Mozambique was accepted as an EITI member in February 2009 and constituted a MSG to 
monitor and manage the implementation of EITI processes. The MSG comprises of three 
government representatives, four from CSOs, four from private companies, and two 
observers. The Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy chairs the MSG. With the support 
of the Mozambican EITI (MEITI) secretariat and donors, about 40 CSOs have established a 
platform (the Civil Society Platform for Natural Resources and Extractive Industries – 
CSPEINR) enabling members to engage with both state and private corporations in 
transparency and accountability issues using ID from the EITI and their own private 
investigations. The CSPEINR secretariat is held on a two-year rotational basis; from 2015 to 
2017, the CIP hosted it.  
 
The MEITI, which is located in the World Bank project office in Maputo has been funded 
mostly by the World Bank with the GoM funding only about 25 per cent; around US$50,000 
(EITI 2017). Other development partners such as Canada, GIZ and UNDP have also 
provided financial support to the secretariat. The UNDP and other development partners 
have also trained CSOs, including journalists, to report news on the extractive sector. In 
March 2017, World Bank funding had finished, however, and the GoM was in the process of 
initiating a new funding mechanism. 
 
Objectives and work plans developed by the MSG guide the MEITI implementation. In the 
2016–18 work plan, MEITI established the following objectives: (a) to ensure access to 
extractive information so as to promote informed public debate on extractive resources 
governance; (b) to improve accountability mechanisms for public and private companies in 
the extractive sector; (c) to clarify and disseminate the allocation of receipts mechanism for 
the development of affected communities; (d) to strengthen the monitoring and intervention 
roles of the MSG; (e) to improve transparency in the license granting process; and (f) to 
improve the business environment in the country (EITI 2017: 12). The MEITI performs 
administrative, logistical and coordination support in the implementation of MSG work plans, 
completion of reporting templates, development of terms of reference (ToR) for the 
independent evaluator, and preparation of MSG meetings. However, much of the work of 
MEITI is focused on the development of EITI annual and validation reports. The first EITI 
report was published in 2009 and by March 2012, the EITI board had declared Mozambique 
EITI compliant; meaning it had fulfilled the EITI rules (EITI 2012). Mozambique EITI has 
produced six major EITI reports. The 2017 report declared the country to have made 
‘meaningful progress’ with respect to the EITI standard.  
 
With a high level of public debt arising from corruption and the expectation that extractive 
revenues could be used to clandestinely defray the debt, the EITI’s objective of ensuring 
transparency through ID is imperative in Mozambique. However if the primary outcome of ID 
is to reduce conflict of interest and corruption, then the EITI seems to have been 
unsuccessful as there are many known government and Frelimo party officials who own 
mining concessions in the country. The African Investigative Publishing Collective in 
partnership with Africa Uncensored and ZAM has mentioned names of powerful public 
12 
 
officials that have grabbed mining concessions in Montepuez district to produce and export 
rubies. This includes the former Public Works Minister, Defence Minister, Mayor of Maputo, 
Agriculture Minister, Frelimo-connected lawyer and head of Mozambique’s security service, 
and a military general (AIPC 2017: 11).  
 
 
3  Literature review on the nexus between ID 
and accountability  
ID and transparency are two core principles of good governance. While ID makes facts, 
figures, data, and details about an entity public; transparency involves both the processes 
that lead to an effective release of such information, the trust people have in the information 
that is disclosed, and its accessibility to the general public (Kaufmann and Bellver 2005; 
Joshi, 2010; World Bank 2016: 171). Both ID and transparency are connected to raising civic 
awareness and holding duty bearers accountable (Gaventa and Barrett 2012). Theoretically 
both can be described as a ‘public good’ hence the market may fail in their provision 
(Kreitmair 2015). Market failure means that some form of public policy may be needed to 
optimise the provision of such goods. But given that ID can have negative consequences for 
politicians; there is less incentive for a corrupt government to use public policy to intervene, 
hence state failure. The double jeopardy of state and market failure means that it is in the 
interest of citizens and their organisations to seek information themselves to hold a 
government and private interest accountable. Consequently in many countries, CSOs have 
pushed for the passage of laws on Freedom of Information (FoI). By 2017, 22 African 
countries had enacted FoI legislation; a remarkable improvement from 2014, when only  
13 countries had done so (Mohan 2014; AFEX 2017).  
 
Pro-accountability campaigners believe that FoI laws could empower citizens to demand 
access to information in a context where rational interest does not compel those with 
information to voluntarily disclose their private interest. With access to public interest 
information, it is assumed that citizens and pro-accountability organisations will be 
empowered to act. The logic of this presumption lies on the basis that information is power 
and citizens with access to information will use it to demand accountability from government 
and private corporations. But how does ID work to influence citizens’ action for 
accountability? The information-transparency action cycle by Fung et al. (2004) provides 
some clues. 
 
According to Fung et al. (ID has effects on public accountability when information enters the 
calculus of the user and subsequently triggers a chain reaction: comprehension, action, and 
response (2004: 9). Fung et al. argue that information is a necessary condition, but not 
sufficient to trigger action due to conflicting preferences, cognitive challenges, and other 
hindering factors such as: ‘perceived value’ of the information in advancing a user’s goal; 
compatibility of the information to a users’ routine decision-making; the way the information 
is presented (quick and easy reading); the time it is released; and the credibility of the actor 
that releases the information.  
 
Accountability on the other hand means an actor or duty-bearer being held responsible for its 
(in)actions and behaving according to a set of standards. It involves ‘setting standards, 
getting information about actions, making judgments about appropriateness and sanctioning 
unsatisfactory performance’ (Joshi 2010: 5). Accountability mechanisms compel public 
leaders to reduce their private interest and rent seeking. However, empirical evidence on the 
impact of ID on indicators of accountability is a mixed bag. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) found 
that increased budget transparency is associated with a reduction of perceptions of 
corruption. This relationship is however conditioned by: (i) having a competitive media that is 
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eager to search for quality information; (ii) a society where a greater percentage of the 
population is educated and can process available information, and; (iii) the capacity of CSOs 
to empower and mobilise people to act on the basis of information disclosed.  
 
In Uganda, the Reinikka and Svensoon (2005) widely cited study on the power of ID on 
accountability shows that the government’s monthly publication of educational grants in local 
newspapers reduced capture and corruption of public funds from 80 per cent in 1995 to less 
than 20 per cent in 2001. The study concluded that public access to information was a 
powerful deterrent to corruption, as local government officers could no longer hide the 
government grants from parents. However, in a review of five public governance initiatives6 
that encourage disclosure of information and public participation, Brockmyer and Fox (2015) 
concluded that generally evidence of ID impact on public accountability or social and 
economic improvement is weak or non-existent. Earlier analysis by Rocha Menocal and 
Sharma (2008) on the impact of voice and accountability initiatives on MDGs could not 
clearly find a demonstrable impact. However they could find improvement in intermediary 
outcomes such as policy changes and responsiveness by public officers.  
 
If the relationship between citizens and government is seen in the form of principal-agent, 
then information and accountability relate in a situation where citizens as voters (principal) 
can punish the government (agents) if the citizens have information on the actions and 
inactions of the government. Where information is not disclosed, the vertical accountability 
mechanism is broken (Keefer and Khemani 2005; Stromberg 2001). Lack of information 
discourages participation hence people are unable to form interest groups that use the 
political process to agitate for their interests. Educational campaigns that enable citizens to 
understand the implications of the government budget, expenditure and revenue and how 
those relate to citizens’ standards of living provide incentives for citizens’ action (Michener 
2015). Withholding information from citizens is therefore an important strategy by 
governments to create rent or reduce the harmful effect of public knowledge and opinion. It 
also makes it difficult for the citizens to punish an inefficient or bad government.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that users of information are diverse, they may be 
citizens, voters, employers, employees, youth, urbanites, poor, rich, activists, students, etc. 
or a combination of diverse groups hence their interests may differ. Given the diverse 
interest of these groups, they may be casually or intensely interested in new information that 
is disclosed. In a fragile and conflict affected setting (FCAS), new information may impose 
direct and indirect costs that far outweigh the expected immediate benefits to diverse 
information users. This may include individual safety in taking rational actions following new 
information. The literature provides a number of contextual and structural factors that either 
facilitate or constrain the information–accountability nexus. Below we summarise some of 
these mediating factors from the literature. 
 
3.1 Factors that mediate information disclosure–accountability nexus 
3.1.1 Quality of information 
The quality of information is likely to mediate between transparency and citizen action for 
accountability. Apathy is an action; meaning citizens have made deliberate decisions not to 
act for several reasons including the quality of the information provided. For ID to have the 
potential to generate citizen action, it has to be targeted, translated into a language that the 
people can understand and relate to, and must suggest an actionable position (Fung et al. 
2004; Brockmyer and Fox 2015: 28). Untargeted ID and unspecified civic action are likely to 
have no effect (World Bank 2016). The information has to be disseminated at the opportune 
                                                          
6  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), Construction Sector Transparency Initiatives (CSTI), Open 
Government Partnership (OGP), Global Initiative on Fiscal Transparency (GIFT) and Open Contracting Partnership 
(OCP). 
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time. For example, a study in Brazil shows that the timing of the release of audit reports 
correlates with voters’ choices in voting for a change of leaders. Mayors that are shown to 
have adverse findings in an audit report are sanctioned at the polls, while those with better 
findings are voted for. The study shows that such impacts are stronger in municipalities 
where there are local radio stations to spread the information (Ferraz and Finan 2008).  
 
Other studies show that ID is likely to be effective in triggering citizen action if it provides 
private benefits more than public (Kolstad and Wiig 2009). The reason being that public 
goods tend to have free rider issues. According to Kolstad and Wiig ‘information is likely to 
be effective for government activities that provide private goods, such as subsidized food, 
whereas it is relatively ineffective in the provision of public goods such as infrastructure’ 
(Kolstad and Wiig 2009: 252). The public is likely to react to information being disclosed if 
individuals can relate to its impact or expected outcome. Kolstad and Wiig argue that 
‘providing highly aggregate macroeconomic figures on oil revenues or expenditures, is likely 
to result in collective action problems, because individual incentives to act on the information 
are weak’ (2009: 252).  
 
3.1.2 Degree of citizens’ empowerment and political engagement 
Leveraging citizens’ SPA essentially entails providing them the means to assert their rights 
and entitlements. The ‘means’ is referred to as ‘empowerment’. Rather than relying on the 
proxy actions of others, empowerment establishes agency in the citizens themselves, to act 
on their own behalf. CSOs and NGOs are disclosing information to get communities to know 
what their rights, entitlements and obligations are according to law and policies. In 
Madagascar, a study that assessed the nexus between ID and accountability in the 
extractive sector showed that an inadequate presence of CSOs meant that mining 
corporations cared less about efforts to achieve ‘good governance’, transparency, and 
proper engagement with communities (Sovacool et al. 2016). A highly educated society is 
presumed to complement the ID-accountability nexus. As argued by Fung et al. information 
needs to be processed and an educated society can process information better than a less 
educated one. The educational level of citizens mediates the effectiveness of press freedom 
as an anti-corruption mechanism (Lindstedt and Naurin 2005). In 2008, a study conducted 
by Aaronsen and Brinkerhoff (2011) in 23 countries concluded that the EITI MSG is good as 
long as the public is able to make sense of its reports and for government to implement its 
recommendations. But key constraining factors about the usefulness of the EITI reports are 
many, including illiteracy, livelihood demands, lack of interest, and/or cultural and political 
factors. The EITI reports also require some highly technical knowledge to understand them. 
 
3.1.3 Nature of political regimes and competitive party politics 
The nature of the political regime is an important factor in explaining the outcome between 
transparency and accountability. In competitive democratic states where leaders are elected 
on the basis of public knowledge, ID is likely to have much more impact than uncompetitive 
democratic states (World Bank 2016). Even in less competitive party states such as 
Vietnam, a study shows that ID induced significant changes in the central political party’s 
decisions (Malesky, Schuler and Tran 2012). In competitive democratic politics, where the 
media reports on corruption scandals, opposition parties may capitalise on this to promise 
greater transparency and accountability. A single dominant party regime is less concerned 
about domestic reputation or the possibility that an opposition party may take advantage of a 
corruption scandal, unless they seek to obtain international legitimacy (Michener 2015; 
Wehner and De Renzio 2013). Wehner and De Renzio (2013) show in their analysis of 85 
countries that domestic politics is a key factor in determining the level of fiscal transparency 
in a country. That citizens/voters and legislators are the key drivers in achieving fiscal 
transparency. Where demand from these two groups is weak, there is strong doubt that 
external initiatives like EITI can achieve progress in fiscal transparency. Legislators in a 
competitive multi-party system have greater incentive to use ID to hold governments 
15 
 
accountable for the simple reason that their own electoral hopes may be enhanced. 
However, in a country dominated by a single party, legislators may be unwilling to advocate 
for greater accountability using ID because that can negatively affect the legislator’s own 
political career as party insiders use the whip to discipline party members according to party 
interest. Acosta’s (2009) analysis on a programme in Ghana and Tanzania to strengthen 
MPs’ role in promoting accountability in the extractive industry, illustrates how the nature of 
party politics influences a legislator’s incentive structure.  
 
Citizen political engagement in the governance of a country, both as voters who select and 
sanction political leaders, and as organised groups putting pressure on elected and 
appointed public officials, is an important factor in mediating the information and 
accountability nexus (World Bank 2016: 55). The literature suggests that in the history of 
nations where institutions have been effective in changing the way a government works, 
transparency mechanisms have worked in combination with progressive political 
engagement (Camp, Dixit and Stokes 2014). Available evidence seems to suggest that 
transparency initiatives focused on citizen engagement outside the political process are less 
effective in promoting government accountability. As argued by the World Bank, in the 
absence of political engagement, ID will have a momentary effect. For instance, a media 
campaign may reduce public corruption but corruption may re-emerge when the ‘noise’ is 
over (World Bank 2016). 
 
Furthermore, through patronage politics, the government can distort the potential effect of ID 
on voters’ behaviour. So instead of collective demand for accountability, the citizens 
acquiesce. Corrupt politicians invest in campaigns to counter any effect of ID on citizens’ 
voting pattern. This includes increasing vote buying, using coercion, or attacking the 
credibility and sources of the information. Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2012) analysis in 
Uganda showed that although citizens were sensitive to ID via a service delivery scorecard, 
it did not substantially change their voting pattern. They concluded that politicians are able to 
discredit the information that is disclosed if it works against them. In Mexico, Chong et al. 
(2015) found that there was no effect between ID provided by NGOs through a door-to-door 
campaign and voters’ choices in the election because citizens mistrusted the information 
provided by NGOs. 
 
3.2 Evidence of progress in accountability outcomes 
Various studies have examined evidence of the impact of EITI on general governance and 
development outcomes and reached several conclusions (Hilson and Maconachie 2008; 
Sovacool et al. 2016; Corrigan 2014). Rainbow Insight reported that the EITI multi-
stakeholder initiative has made a major impact on the capacity of the public to analyse and 
debate fiscal policies in many countries where in the past natural resource revenues had 
been opaque (Rainbow Insight 2009). The impact stories of a number of multi-stakeholder 
initiatives indicate that CSOs have succeeded in passing or modifying laws on the extractive 
industry. Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria have all enshrined rules for revenue disclosure into 
national law, although many of these laws are not followed through. In Nigeria, EITI ‘has 
identified US$9.8b of oil revenue owed to the Federal Government, of which US$2.4b has 
been recovered’ through campaign activities (Andreasen 2016: 1; Brockmyer and Fox 2015: 
27).  
 
In Nigeria, militias in the Niger Delta have used unruly SPAs to hold extractives to account, 
while another coalition of CSOs and labour unions under the loose umbrella, ‘Occupy 
Nigeria’ have staged protests based on information regarding the effect of institutional 
corruption on oil subsidy payments and mismanagement of oil revenues. The group 
effectively used multi-media and protests to hasten the federal government’s announcement 
of a reduction in petroleum prices (Ako and Ekhator 2016). In Burkina Faso, ID in EITI 
reports in 2014 resulted in civil society protests and public pressure, drawing MPs’ attention 
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to poor mining communities and leading to their subsequent approval of an increase in 
royalties from 0.5 to 1 per cent (EITI 2014; One 2016). In Sierra Leone, international 
organisations and the Kimberly Process ended the trading of blood diamonds (Howard 
2015). The lessons from these countries show that compelling, fact-based campaigns can 
lead to legal reforms, even in the face of industry and government resistance. The use of 
both traditional and social media is important for mobilising public pressure to overcome the 
reluctance of vested interests to policy change.  
 
Taking official development assistance (ODA) receipts as a proxy for economic impact, 
David-Barrett and Okamura (2016) show that countries implementing EITI received 
proportionately more aid than non-EITI countries when resource endowment is a key factor. 
Such countries attribute their increase in ODA to increasing credibility generated on the 
international stage by their participation in the EITI. Schmaljohann (2013) found that EITI 
implementation on average increased a country’s ratio of FDI inflows to GDP by two 
percentage points. Using a panel data over a period of 17 years (1997/98 to 2014), Caitlin 
assessed the impact of the EITI on changes in economic and corruption indicators of 
member and non-member countries and found that the ‘EITI has had a significant and 
positive effect on economic development in member states but these effects have not yet 
been translated to observable and significant improvements in control of corruption’ (2014: 
1). While statistical analysis from these studies may have shown either a positive or negative 
effect of the EITI on FDI, ODA and GDP growth, the micro economic effect of extractives on 
mining communities’ livelihoods, income growth and standard of living is generally poor in 
Africa.  
 
In Chad, the government has allowed public debate about transparency and 
mismanagement of oil revenues, but it routinely ignores public criticism (Bryan and Hofmann 
2007: 50). In their analysis of studies on MSGs, Rustad et al. 2017 show that only 2 out of 
14 promote public debate about the management of extractive resource revenue in their 
countries. Reduction in corruption as an indicator of EITI outcome is not confirmed in several 
studies (Corrigan 2014; Ölcer 2009; Aaronsen and Brinkerhoff 2011; Scanteam 2011; Smith 
et al. 2012; Sovacool and Andrews 2015; Sovacool et al. 2016). An impact analysis 
conducted by Sovacool and Andrews (2015) in Azerbaijan and Liberia was unable to 
attribute significant governance improvements to the implementation of EITI. Studies 
conducted in Ghana (Andrews 2016), Madagascar (Smith et al. 2012), and Kyrgyzstan 
(Furstenberg 2015) did not find positive a governance outcome as a result of MSGs. Using 
more recent data of year-to-year changes in the corruption perception index, Kasekende et al. 
(2016) found that EITI is actually associated with worsening perceived levels of corruption in 
participating countries. Corrigan (2014) found that countries implementing EITI did not 
significantly improve on levels of democracy and political stability, but the study concluded 
that in general, the initiative helped participating countries to ease some of the negative 
consequences of resource abundance. For instance the negative effect on GDP per capita, 
the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies, and the level of 
rule of law are mitigated. 
 
4  Research method: hypothesis, data 
collection and analytical framework  
Based on the evidence arising from the literature and our understanding of the Mozambican 
context, we analyse why ID by CIP, MEITI and others has not triggered SPA in Mozambique. 
We hypothesise that social and political inaction (SPI) for government accountability in the 
extractive sector is due to four major factors: 
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A: The quality of information disclosed by EITI, CIP and the MSG 
B: The capacity of citizens, CSOs and state accountability institutions to act on the basis 
of ID 
C: Mozambique’s institutional and structural context that provides incentives and 
sanctions for SPA 
D: The financial and technical support that external agencies provide to the government  
 
We represent the above hypothesis in a simple exploratory model: 
 
Y= f (a, b, c, d)  
 
Where Y= SPI (dependent variable); and A, B, C, and D are ‘independent’ variables.  
 
We represent our ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ variables based on the literature review and 
our knowledge of the Mozambique context in an analytical framework in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 Study analytical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
We argue that the four ‘independent variables’ interact or connect with one another and 
together contribute to SPA/SPI by citizens and pro-accountability institutions. We applied 
three empirical data collection techniques that include: (i) scoping survey; (ii) focus group 
discussions (FGDs) and participatory workshops; and (iii) triangulation of information through 
semi-structured interviews with key informants and institutions. During the scoping and 
mapping survey, we talked to the four CSOs that are represented on the MSG, the EITI 
Secretariat, extractive corporations, international organisations, development partners, and 
government sector ministries to identify specific SPAs that have occurred as a result of ID by 
EITI, CIP or any of the members of the civil society platform on extractives; and whether 
those actions contributed in any way to government accountability. Having ascertained that 
very little SPA has taken place, we proceeded to ask the institutions what factors might have 
contributed to SPI. The explanations provided were identified in the four major factors in our 
hypothesis.  
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The second phase of the study involved organising 9 FGDs that comprised politicians, 
researchers, leaders and representatives of CSOs and CBOs, women’s groups, and sub-
national government bureaucrats. During each of the 9 FGDs, we explained our hypothesis 
and asked participants to identify specific sub-factors of the four major factors and narrate 
how they connect with one another to ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ SPI. In phase three, we conducted 
15 semi-structured interviews with senior central government officers, donors and 
development partners, EITI and CSOs on specific factors that the FGDs raised as 
contributing to SPI. The field research was conducted in Maputo and Cabo Delgado over a 
period of 12 months. Because of security reasons we could not visit the mining communities. 
The study protects the rights, anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. 
 
 
5  Analysis and findings 
5.1 Quality of ID for SPA 
In the extractive sector, information on contracts and concessions, taxes and revenues that 
companies pay to the government, revenues earmarked as royalties to sub-national 
governments and/or mining communities, and public investments arising from extractive 
revenue are of interest to the public in view of their potential effects on citizens’ social and 
economic welfare. Participants spoken to in the study mentioned four factors that relate to 
the quality of ID. These factors are allocated specific numbers (from A1 to A4) to correspond 
with our independent variable ‘A’.  
 
A1:  Little appreciation by citizens and pro-accountability institutions of EITI and CIP 
information disclosure on extractive governance 
A2:  Mode of dissemination of extractive information 
A3:  Groups targeted with ID (Maputo elites, academics, public officers, public 
intellectuals, etc.) 
A4:  CIP, EITI and CSOs advocate for civic action through parliament, state agencies and 
the international community but less on citizens’ action 
 
We elaborate on how these four sub-factors connect to contribute to SPI below. 
 
A1: Little appreciation of ID on extractives provided by EITI and CIP 
Since 2009 the MEITI has produced six annual reports that provide information on 
extractives that otherwise would not be available to the public. The MEITI reports disclose 
information on bidding rounds that have been organised in the oil and gas sectors, an 
overview of the applicants, the licence awardee, and maps outlining the areas for each 
round, production levels of extractives, the monetary value, the contribution to total 
government revenue, the nature of governance of the sector, an assessment of the 
government’s commitment to transparency, monitoring of legal provisions related to 
disclosure of contracts, and government transfers of royalties to sub-national governments 
and communities. The EITI validation reports aim to provide all stakeholders with an 
impartial assessment of whether EITI implementation in Mozambique is consistent with the 
provisions of the EITI standard.  
 
The 2017 EITI report discloses that there is a lack of information on the financial relationship 
between the government and state-owned enterprises (SoEs) in the form of dividends, 
financing, loans and reinvestments. The report gives the example of gas tariffs and 
transportation revenue associated with ROMPCO, where dividends from the SoE and 
payment to government, and off-budget operations are opaque (EITI 2017: 44–45). The 
report further shows that none of the 48 extractive companies disclosed information on 
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beneficial ownership. This is a new EITI requirement that CIP has argued Mozambique 
needs to implement. Disclosure of beneficiary ownership provides information on the identity 
of the real owners of an extractive company beyond what is usually put on registration 
documents. Furthermore, the EITI validation report provides information to show that the 
government’s budgetary allocation to mining communities does not correspond with the 2.75 
per cent stated in the law.7 In addition, the 2017 EITI report shows that 17 out of 71 private 
companies that reported having paid revenue to the government failed to reconcile their 
payment with the independent administrator because, among other reasons, they were 
unaware of EITI requirements. Despite this information, none of the members of the MSG or 
the CSO platform have used the findings of the report to organise public debate or follow-up 
actions with state institutions. 
 
CIP, on the other hand, has undertaken private investigation outside of the MEITI work plan 
into contracts related to gas and coal mining in Mozambique and published it findings 
(Nuvunga and Mapisse 2017; CIP 2015). CIP described the Petroleum Production 
Agreement between the GoM and Sasol8 as a ‘rip-off’. The report shows that Sasol’s under-
pricing of gas over the last ten years has resulted in the government receiving a paltry 
US$141 million in tax and royalties instead of US$500 million. CIP shows that Sasol 
manipulated its operational cost to make it possible to under-declare revenue to the state, 
and that its US$1 billion gas extraction and pipeline project had not delivered many of the 
benefits it promised to the Mozambican people. The report further raised concerns about 
potential corrupt deals that might have influenced the nature of the contract. Sasol 
vehemently disputes the claims, saying the findings contain inaccuracies and create 
unfounded perceptions regarding both the inflation of costs and transfer prices. 
 
For the first ten years of the project, about US$1 billion (2004-2014) has flown to the 
Government of Mozambique instead of the US$500 million quoted by CIP. 
Furthermore, based on our current projections, our contribution over the lifetime of the 
Petroleum Production Agreement (PPA) project would be closer to over US$3 billion. 
(Sasol’s response to CIP report, Sasol 2017) 
 
While both the Mozambican Tax Authority and the Ministry of Economy and Finance showed 
interest in CIP’s report, by being present at its launch; in general state institutions have been 
hesitant to follow up on any accountability action. Towards the end of 2017, Electricidade de 
Moçambique (EDM) showed interest in the report by requesting CIP to make a detailed 
presentation to them, but no substantial action followed this. The World Bank and the IMF 
also disagreed with the findings but failed to provide clear answers to the issues that CIP 
raised. In 2018, the Governor of Inhambane Province boldly said that the GoM had lost 
confidence in Sasol. According to the Governor, Sasol has not been fulfilling its social 
responsibility to the people in the province (Chapo 2018). 
 
CIP has also investigated a number of unfair contract deals and the management of the 2.75 
per cent in mining revenues that should be transferred to mining communities as royalties. 
This includes Kenmare heavy sands (contract and fulfilment of legal obligations to Moma 
communities), and Vale, Jindal, and ICVL on coal. On average, CIP claims to investigate 
about 15 suspected cases of conflict of interest and public fraud a year. While private 
companies mentioned in CIP’s ID and ‘naming and shaming’ are quick to react forcefully, 
and in many cases disagree with CIP’s findings; the public reaction has been indifferent. 
With the exception of the resettlement advocacy work pursued by CTV, neither CIP nor the 
EITI reports have been used as sources for further state investigation, public protest, or led 
                                                          
7  Law 20/2014 requires that 2.75 per cent of the revenues generated in the petroleum and mining sectors should be 
allocated towards developing the communities where the extractive resources are located. 
8  Sasol is an integrated chemical and energy company based in South Africa. 
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to state prosecution. CIP believes that in many communities, ID on extractives has not 
reached the people, and those that are aware appear to have resigned themselves to 
‘minding their own business’, while responses from pro-accountability state institutions have 
been muted as if to echo the slogan of the former President Joaquim Chissano – ‘let it go’. 
The following reasons why ID is not leading to citizen action were put forward by CIP staff 
during a FGD on 8 August 2017:  
 
Until people believe that their daily lives will change they’ll not act. They simply don’t 
get it with ID. 
 
People are concerned about their private interest. They see ID and the work CIP does 
as anti-government so they don’t want to be associated with it. People’s appreciation 
to ID is little to compel them to act. 
 
A2–A3: Mode of dissemination of extractive information and target groups 
The MEITI reports are disseminated to sector ministries, the MSG, parliament, development 
partners and published on EITI’s website. The MEITI occasionally organises workshops in 
the provincial capitals to disseminate its reports. CIP, on the other hand, uses both 
traditional media (newspaper and TV) and social media to disseminate its reports on 
extractive governance. However, dissemination through traditional media is limited to a few 
elites. The largest circulation newspaper prints no more than 20,000 copies in a country of 
about 28 million people. Cable TV reaches less than 1 million people. Almost all newspapers 
and print media are published in Portuguese, and given that about 45 per cent of the 
population cannot read and write, their reach is minuscule (Salgado 2014). CIP targets the 
youth with information on corruption via social media because it believes that if there will be 
any SPA in the country it is more likely to come from the youth. Table 5.1 shows some of the 
informatics on CIP publications on extractives. 
 
Table 5.1 Informatics on CIP ID on extractives 
Name of publication Date of 
publication 
Website 
downloads 
Facebook 
views and likes 
Mailchimp 
(mailing list) 
Receipts from LNG will flow first to the 
enterprises and only afterwards to the 
Mozambican government 
5 June 2017 1,484 50,025 5,277 
Domestic natural gas from the Rovuma 
Basin: Non transparent process selects 
doubtful enterprises 
20 March 
2017 
5,147 89,510 5,213 
There is too much optimism about the 
amount of the capital gains taxes 
13 March 
2017 
9,720 95,501 1,349 
What can Mozambique do to save its 
coal industry? 
6 November 
2016 
3,085 47,509 5,274 
Who is behind the enterprises that exploit 
the mining resources? 
31 October 
2016 
3,642 420,581 3,585 
Doing the groundwork to avoid the 
resource curse in Mozambique 
18 May 2016 10,766 28,521 5,185 
LNG from the Rovuma Basin: When will 
Anadarko invest in Area 1? 
13 March 
2016 
5,211 76,256 1,588 
Oil majors fight over Angoche Blocks in 
5th licensing round: Will Frelimo-linked 
Petroinveste be forced on the winners? 
11 August 
2015 
1,265 112,588 4,050 
 
By making investigative reports public, CIP aims to pressure state accountability institutions 
into investigating and prosecuting cases of alleged corruption. 
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Analysis and findings of the responses from the FGDs show that CIP and EITI work on ID in 
the extractive industry is fairly well known in Maputo, but outside the capital recognition is 
more limited. Seven out of the 11 CSO FGD participants working in the province where 
minerals are extracted had not heard of the work that CIP or EITI does on transparency. 
Only four out of the ten urban youth in the FGD (see Table 5.2) said they had heard about 
the CIP Sasol report, but none expressed interest in the story because it was complicated to 
understand.  
 
I posted it on my Facebook but people didn’t pay attention to it. It was as if they didn’t 
understand. People didn’t know what to do with it because CIP did not tell them what to 
do.  
(Male youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018). 
 
Table 5.2 Awareness about transparency work in the extractive sector 
Are you aware about the information and transparency work that 
CIP and EITI undertake in extractive governance? 
No. of 
participants 
Responses 
Focus groups  Yes % No % 
Academics and researchers based in Maputo 11 100 0 
Leaders of the mining community 4 75 25 
CSOs in Cabo Delgado 11 36 64 
Women’s associations in Cabo Delgado  9 22 78 
CSOs in Maputo 11 100 0 
MPs 3 100 0 
Provincial government officers 3 67 33 
Urban youth 10 40 60 
Total 61 66 34 
 
From the FGDs there is a perception among academics, MPs, government officials, and 
CSOs based in Maputo that ID could promote SPA for government accountability (see Table 
5.3). They gave a number of anecdotes from outside the extractive sector where information 
has led to SPA and a positive government response. However, CSOs based in the Cabo 
Delgado province and urban youth rejected the idea that ID is critical to promoting SPA. 
They argued that information is important but is insufficient. 
 
Table 5.3 Stakeholders’ perception of ID and SPA  
Do you think ID can trigger SPA for government 
accountability in the extractive sector?  
No. of 
participants 
Yes (%) No (%) 
Academics and researchers 11 100 0 
Community leaders  4 75 25 
CSOs from the provincial capital (Pemba) 11 0 100 
CSOs from Maputo 11 72 28 
Members of Parliament 3 100 0 
Women’s groups 9 100 0 
Provincial government 3 100 0 
Urban youth 10 40 60 
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Yes, information is prerequisite for transparency, and transparency is necessary for 
accountability. But the leadership of government restricts information flow to opposition 
legislature that is supposed to provide checks. The executive is only interested in 
working with the majority in parliament. The MPs that can make a difference do not 
receive information and when they receive information, they do not have sufficient 
power and funds to initiate action.  
(Opposition MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018) 
 
CIP admits though that reaching out to local communities with ID is one of the challenges 
that the organisation faces. The sheer size of the country and the fact that CIP does not 
have affiliated grassroots organisations makes it difficult to have face-to-face interactions 
with people outside Maputo.  
 
We recognise that mobilising citizens for collective action especially in the remote 
areas requires face-to-face interactions but we do not have the capacity to do so. 
While our news conferences and newspaper articles easily reach urban residents, we 
need to consider different approaches to reaching out to rural communities. Rural 
people have less information and proper understanding of the extractive contracts and 
the consequences. You need to connect corruption with poor services that they 
receive in a face-to-face meeting before they can take action.  
(Interview with a CIP founding member, August 2017) 
 
MPs, on the other hand, argue that information on extractive contracts come to them too late 
to be useful for decision-making.  
 
Contracts are signed before they are presented to parliament. What else can you do? 
EITI reports come to us late. You only comment and ‘cry’ but there is little to change. 
Given the context of Mozambique, it would have been appropriate that the MSG 
includes a representative of parliament and especially opposition political parties. The 
executive is part of the MSG but not the MPs?  
(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018) 
 
In 2018 and before this study was completed, the EITI co-ordinating unit agreed to include a 
representative of parliament as an observer in the MSG.  
 
A4: Unclear proposal on citizens action to follow ID  
Neither MEITI nor CIP reports suggest clear SPA by citizens to promote government 
accountability. MEITI annual reports make general recommendations, but do not suggest 
specific pro-accountability groups taking action; at best they put the responsibility on the 
government to take action.   
 
CIP information seems to inform academics, urban elites and public intellectuals but to 
change people’s current attitude of passiveness, ID must reach the larger population 
outside Maputo and explain what we need to do. CIP and EITI must not only inform the 
people but also must mobilise and support the masses to act in ways to improve 
accountability.  
(Male youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018) 
 
While CIP’s report on the Sasol gas project attracted media attention in Mozambique and 
South Africa, it failed to suggest specific actions for citizens to take. Rather it warned that it 
would deliver its protest to the ANC-led government in South Africa and the African Union on 
behalf of the Mozambican people because it does not believe that either the GoM or Sasol 
will take action to ensure Mozambique benefits from the gas exploitation (CIP 2017). CIP 
hopes to take the case to the new South African government of President Ramaphosa.  
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The CIP believes that some of its ID could trigger unruly citizen action,  
 
We expect citizens to demand accountability from the government in a civic manner. 
However if by providing information and educating the public, an unruly civic action 
arises so be it!  
(Speech by the Executive Director of CIP, workshop, 5 December 2017) 
 
The responsibility for action is delegated to state institutions. But in a context where state 
accountability institutions are totally controlled by party interest, very little SPA can come 
from these institutions without citizen action. 
 
5.2 Capacity of citizens, CSOs and state institutions to take action 
From the narratives provided by interviewees and our analysis, there are four capacity 
related factors labelled ‘B1–B5’ that combine to effect SPI among citizens and pro-
accountability institutions despite the availability of information on corrupt extractive 
governance. 
 
B1:  Citizen high illiteracy rate, inadequate consciousness, civic values and voice 
B2:  High levels of economic vulnerability and poverty  
B3:  Citizens’ disbelief of their capacity to take action on the basis of new information  
B4:  CSOs’ inability to mobilise citizens  
 
B1: Citizen high illiteracy rate, inadequate consciousness, civic values and voice 
Education and conscientisation9 are tools for empowering people to pursue SPA to demand 
their rights and to hold a government accountable. Mozambique has an adult illiteracy rate of 
45 per cent, one of the highest in the world (UNESCO 2016: 10). But in Cabo Delgado, a 
province in the north where numerous precious minerals are extracted and where a LNG 
project is underway, the illiteracy rate is as high as 60.7 per cent. Adult illiteracy in rural 
Mozambique on average 66 per cent. While EITI and CIP reports may be publicly available, 
a high illiteracy rate makes understanding and using the information for SPA impossible. 
Only 11 per cent of the population can speak Portuguese, but the reports are rarely 
translated into local languages. As a result, ID on extractives rarely improves citizens’ 
awareness and consciousness about how corruption in contracts relates to their living 
conditions. Provincial government officials and MEITI coordinators argue that the people fail 
to make extensive use of ID because their levels of education are very low.  
 
Community members at Pemba also argue that while they may accept that ID is important 
for transparency in the extractive sector, they have not seen any tangible results coming out 
from civil society representation on the EITI. They argue that access to information on EITI 
findings is limited to participating CSOs, and people who live in Maputo. Nevertheless, they 
praised the legal action that CTV took against Anadarko in the Afungi Peninsula case by 
mobilising communities to demand their land rights.  
 
FGD participants argued that many people in rural areas do not understand that their poverty 
conditions are a consequence of their inaction against the government.  
 
People don’t understand that donors have pulled out because of government 
corruption but when you explain to them, they will still not take action because the 
values embedded in civic responsibilities to protect public interest are not part of our 
culture. People lost their civic responsibility to the state after independence and during 
                                                          
9  The process of making people aware of the contradictions of their socio-economic, political and cultural circumstances 
that diminish their wellbeing. Conscientisation happens when a critical awareness is formed among the people who 
have been oppressed, leading to collective action. 
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the reign of President Chisano when ‘Deixa-andar’ (let it go) mentality crept into 
people’s sub-consciousness.  
(Interview with CSO in Maputo, 14 March 2018) 
 
The former President is alleged to have used the phrase ‘Don’t worry, people want to eat a 
little, let it go’ to disregard accountability. Speaking at the Police Practical School in 
Marracuene District, the current President, Filipe Nyusi, stressed that civic and patriotic 
education among citizens is needed to fight corruption in the country. Such education is 
needed to awaken the moral values and awareness of the people (AllAfrica 2017).  
 
Education is not only about reading and writing but it is also about conscientisation. If 
you don’t have a certain level of reason to protest, then you don’t protest. 
Conscientisation includes a certain degree of citizenship, values and awareness. 
(Interview with a MP, Maputo, 15 March 2018) 
 
B2: High levels of economic vulnerability  
Poverty and economic vulnerability are constrains to accessing and making use of ID to 
pursue collective action. The cost of a newspaper is almost US$1 so that restricts many of 
the few people who can read from accessing information via print media. As argued by many 
of the CSOs, poverty is a major issue that works against citizen mobilisation for SPA for 
accountability. Unlike rural communities where the majority may be illiterate, in urban areas 
like Maputo, CIP sees the challenge to citizen action differently; people are afraid to act 
because doing so means losing their economic livelihoods.  
 
In Maputo, it is not because people don’t understand the implications of the information 
we disclose. They are afraid to be associated with CIP because doing so means losing 
their livelihoods. There are many people who work in the government and in the 
private sector including the informal sector who depend on the state in one way or the 
other for their livelihoods. These people will never sacrifice their economic privileges to 
pursuing public protest.  
(Interview with the CIP Executive Director, December 2017) 
 
Access to sustainable income and resources is controlled by the ruling regime, so to be seen 
as not affiliated to the Frelimo Party is economically suicidal. Without alternative sources of 
livelihood outside the party-state economic network, one is disempowered to act. Economic 
empowerment is key to citizens’ confidence to pursue SPA for accountability but the 
Mozambican middle class is not independent of the state to be able to mobilise to demand 
accountability from their government. As argued by many informants and FGDs, the Maputo 
middle class is related to the state through the rent it provides, so they play it safe.  
 
To get a job in the local administration for only US$200 a month, one needs the party 
state as a reference. Frelimo was smart to capture the economy during privatisation of 
state enterprises. Without economic emancipation, one cannot demand government 
accountability because you are afraid to bite the hands that feed you.  
(Interview with senior citizen linked to the Frelimo Party, Maputo, 13 March 2018) 
 
Maputo’s economy is dependent on government income; even the private sector depends 
very much on government contracts. Without economic independence from the ruling 
government, it is unrealistic to expect people to pursue SPA to hold the government 
accountable. 
 
You have a party that controls the economy so how do you expect social movement to 
arise? Frelimo is so powerful that people are afraid to take action against the 
government. If you’re public officer and complain your career is finished.  
(Provincial public officer, FGD, Pemba, 19 March 2018) 
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As people are poor, CSOs believe the incentive to undertake SPA against the government is 
low.   
 
People are poor; you give them information but it does not put food on the table or 
money in their pocket. They will not take action because there is a belief among the 
citizens that any benefit from such action will not come directly them. There is so much 
poverty in the country to expect activism.  
(CSOs, FGD, Maputo, 14 March 2018) 
 
The few who do criticise openly are mainly intellectuals who make a living outside of the 
state. So when low levels of education, poor citizen awareness, concern for ‘bread and 
butter’, and fear come together they constrain people’s ability to pursue SPA even if the 
quality of ID is high. Economic vulnerability also works against public officers using ID to 
trigger traditional accountability mechanisms such as investigations, inspections and audits. 
The Attorney General will not act. The police will not act because they need to protect their 
jobs and income.  
 
As a public sector worker you can lose your job so having the information is good but 
the reality is that information is constrained by other practical and contextual factors. 
(Interview with a senior government officer, Maputo, 31 May 2018) 
 
Joining any public protest or action may result in me losing my job and income. So 
although I have information, I value other aspects that affect myself and family, more 
than any collective gain that may not benefit me.  
(Interview with a public servant, Pemba, 20 March 2018) 
 
B3: Citizens disbelieve of their capacity to act on the basis of information 
Participants from the various FGDs agreed that information that CIP and EITI provide is 
good for building citizen awareness, but that alone does not empower them to take SPA. 
Table 5.4 shows the responses of different FGDs on the question of ID and empowerment. 
 
Table 5.4 Does ID on extractive resources empower you to take SPA? 
Focus group  No. of participants Yes (%) No (%) 
Academics and researchers 11 0 100 
Community members in Pemba 4 25 75 
CSO in Maputo 11 82 18 
Women’s groups 11 100 0 
Youth groups 10 40 60 
 
No doubt, information can empower citizens but you can’t do much with it. In the 
extractive industry, there are many powerful senior Frelimo Party members that 
operate mining concessions so people are afraid to ask accountability questions let 
alone organise SPA against the interest of such powerful party officials. While ID can 
raise people’s awareness, it is not enough to move people into action.  
(Interview with academic/researcher, Maputo, 13 March 2018) 
 
Six out of ten of the urban youth FGD thought that ID does not empower them to act. They 
consider the Mozambican context and people’s practical approach to secured livelihoods as 
their concerns and priority.  
 
26 
 
Information is for our own consumption. It empowers us for our academic purposes but 
not to go on the street to protest because taking part in public protest will not change 
anything in this country.  
(Male youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018)   
 
I don’t think giving me information about corruption on Sasol’s contract is enough to 
push me to protest on the street. Accountability is not part of our culture so having 
information doesn’t change me.  
(Female youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018) 
 
My action alone cannot bring change. My action is filtered through a society that has 
little activism in its culture. As a young person growing up in Maputo, information will 
not empower me to confront a state authority because the police can easily kill you. In 
the northern provinces, the police may not be active to clamp down on public dissent 
that is why they are able to demonstrate and vote against Frelimo but in Maputo that is 
risky to do.  
(Male youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018) 
 
Having information doesn’t trigger action in me because we do not have the leadership 
to lead the youth into action. There are youth associations but the active ones are 
linked to the government. That is why there is no critical debate on issues concerning 
the youth. There is a law on freedom of speech but when people speak freely, they 
suffer consequences.  
(Female youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018) 
 
B4: CSOs’ inability to mobilise citizens for SPA 
There has been a steady growth in the number of CSOs in Mozambique, although the data 
on numbers is unreliable. Most of these organisations prefer to work on providing economic 
and social services that directly benefit the poor, to working on advocacy or political activism 
to promote government accountability.  
 
In terms of activism, there aren’t many CSOs in the country. CIP is more of a think-
tank; taking up street protest is not in their work. This tells you something about the 
nature of CSOs in the country. They are good on demonstrating on Facebook but will 
not take to the street. That is related to economic factors because if you demonstrate 
on the street you’ve no job. But generally our history and culture are not related to 
activism.  
(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018) 
 
Many CSOs are not based in the communities but in the provincial capital and Maputo 
and claim to represent the communities. The MPs do not relay information back to 
their constituents because there isn’t any constituency that they can truly claim to 
represent since they are elected based on party list.  
(Interview with a researcher/academic, Maputo, 13 March 2018) 
 
Our society is not active in the face of poverty, illiteracy and fear but there is also lack 
of civic leadership in the country to mobilise people. The few middle class and urban 
elites that can mobilise people only pursue their self-interest.  
(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018) 
 
CIP’s interaction with citizens outside Maputo is weak. While the organisation analyses 
public sector corruption that has a direct effect on people’s standard of living, its advocacy 
and engagement is focused on national and macro-level issues and by doing so it fails to 
connect with ordinary people at the sub-national level. It has not been able to mobilise 
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people for SPA. It has not established an office outside Maputo although staff occasionally 
visit the mining communities. Both CIP and EITI engagement with communities is the 
weakest link in their efforts to use information to empower citizen action for accountability. 
With a staff of 16 (11 technical and 5 administrative) CIP has capacity challenges, but its 
commitment to the ‘risky job’ of fighting corruption in Mozambique is unflinching. However, it 
has no plans to establish a strong relationship with communities in the fight against 
corruption.  
 
There is a risk that once we establish offices in the provinces, we may be infested by 
the virus – referring to corruption or co-option by the state as some CSOs have been 
compromised. Besides, we don’t have the resources to build affiliated CBOs. NGOs 
that we can work with have moved away from advocacy to poverty alleviation and 
service delivery. They do not want to confront the government.  
(CIP staff and founding members, FGD, August 2017) 
 
In our FGDs and interviews, it was argued by academics, CSOs and some of the 
international organisations, including a bilateral donor that SPA resembling a real social 
movement for change will most likely come from Mozambican youth born after 1992. These 
people constitute about 60 per cent of the population and seem to have less attachment to 
any particular indoctrination associated with either Frelimo or RENAMO. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests youth tend to vote for a third party instead of any of the two known political parties. 
While there is a high expectation among Mozambicans that the urban youth could become 
potential change agents in Mozambique if ID targets them, the FGD with ten selected urban 
youths shows that they may be aware of CIP and the work it does, but cannot be relied on 
yet to embark on SPA. In the FGD 40 per cent suggested that ID provided by CIP and other 
CSOs can influence them to support SPA for accountability, provided other complementary 
factors such as security, employment and income are in place. 
 
5.3 Structural and institutional factors 
Participants of the FGD and informants listed about seven structural and institutional factors 
that contribute to SPI for accountability. We have labelled these factors C1–C7.  
 
C1:  Culture of submissiveness (devoid of confrontation and activism) 
C2:  Fear arising from the nature of the political regime 
C3:  Dominance of a single party and the nature of political representation (party list) 
C4:  Weak horizontal accountability between the executives, judiciary and legislature 
C5:  Wide geographical spread of the country 
C6:  Limited independent media (state-centred and private self-censorship)  
C7: Pro-accountability institutions considerations in the context of conflict and fragility 
 
C1: Culture of submissiveness (devoid of confrontation and action) 
A society’s disposition to embark on collective action to demand accountability from duty 
bearers is influenced by its history and culture. Colonisation and a culture of patriarchy have 
suppressed collective action in the past, as both require the citizen to be submissive to state 
authority. This historical context can develop into an institutional culture of submissiveness 
that perpetuates for a long time. Pieces of historical narrative put together by FGDs and 
corroborated by informants suggest that such a society was built in Mozambique during the 
Portuguese colonisation and this has been carried over to the post-independence era. The 
Marxist-Leninist ideology that characterised post-independence Mozambique perpetuated a 
culture of fear and obedience that further restricted citizen active engagement. The ideology 
has left almost no space for independent social organisations to emerge with a divergence of 
opinions. Formal political party structures and informal traditional authorities at the 
community level are designed to ensure citizen submissiveness. Dissenting views are 
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discouraged at all cost. The default position of the government is that CSOs are agents of 
foreign interests.  
 
In rural areas where there is less information and more control by the state who are 
you to say that government doesn’t work for you? Any information on governance has 
to be mediated through a government administration to be considered credible. 
(Interview with Senior Frelimo Party Officer, 13 March 2018) 
  
For any information provided by a CSO, there is counter information to say that 
‘beware of these people’. They have an agenda to manipulate the citizens. As a result, 
many people don’t trust other sources of information except the state.  
(Interview with Senior Frelimo Party Officer, 13 March 2018) 
 
A UK DFID evaluation report argues that ‘Voice and Accountability’ are unknown concepts, 
which are not easily translated – into Portuguese or into the Mozambican socio-political 
context (Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008: vii). Researchers and academics during the 
FGD expressed similar sentiments: 
 
We never had the opportunity to express our views. Our culture had been to speak in 
one voice. Speaking against the government is interpreted as unpatriotic, traitor and 
against the ideals of the state. Since independence, we’ve been taught to believe in 
the government as a benign actor that seeks first and foremost the interest of all 
citizens. The media has been the same, to speak only in favour of government. The 
newspapers write the same things – what the government wants to hear. Now with 
democracy we are being challenged to think differently. But it’s not in our DNA, our 
culture to hold a government accountable through SPA.  
(Academics and researchers, FGD, Maputo, 13 March 2018) 
 
Historically we’re a passive people. We heard about the hidden public debt and Sasol 
contract but didn’t act because it’s not in our nature to do so especially when it is not 
directly related to you. Knowledge is important but fear is a justification for why people 
don’t act.  
(Provincial CSOs, FGD, Pemba, 19 March 2018) 
 
C2: Fear arising from the nature of the political regime  
The Mozambique Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, association and peaceful 
protest but Frelimo tolerance on these two tenets is not always to be expected. CTV and CIP 
leadership have received threat and harassment for their role in the promotion of 
transparency and accountability in extractive governance. In the wake of the September 
2010 demonstration, the GoM demanded the registration of all SIM cards. It was alleged that 
phone users had used text messages to mobilise people to demonstrate.  
 
Freedom of speech is not respected in the country so people are afraid to speak. In 
the worse scenario, you can lose your life. People hide behind social media to 
communicate but they won’t show their face. They don’t even use their real names in 
case the state authorities trace their identity. They delegate opportunity for change to 
social media but social media does not act. People do.  
(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018) 
 
Last year the youth wanted to demonstrate but saw helicopters hovering over our 
heads that intimidated us. Professor Macuane was shot at. A civil right advocate (Joao 
Massango) wanted to demonstrate against the US$2.2 billion hidden public debt but 
was abducted and beaten.  
(Mozambican urban youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018) 
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In 2013, health professionals including medical doctors mobilised and protested on the 
street. The leader of that movement working for an NGO at that time lost his working 
contract with the NGO. He has children and families… In 2014, we saw this same 
person in Tete province campaigning for the ruling party. He has been compelled to 
support the ruling government.  
(Mozambican urban youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018) 
 
In May 2016, Professor Jose Macuane, a university lecturer and political analyst was shot in 
the leg after he had commented on issues on television that some considered critical of the 
government. The threat on his life was seen as a warning to people that there could be 
serious consequences if you dare embark on street protest. Another example was the threat 
to the Catholic Council for Justice and Peace. The council annually issues a statement that 
tends to criticise the quality of governance in the country. In 2016, the council was asked by 
government communicators to emphasise the spiritual being of citizens and not the nature of 
governance in the country. 
 
C3: Dominance of a single party and the nature of political representation 
The possibility that an alternative government might emerge encourages political groups to 
mobilise and exert pressure on a ruling government to be accountable. ID feeds into that 
pressure to make a government responsive. However, the principal-agent relationship that 
enables democracy to provide incentives and sanctions for accountability does not work in 
Mozambique. The presence of a single dominant political party and the modality based on 
which MPs are elected (party list) are major constraints on SPA. The Mozambican state, to a 
large extent, is represented by the interest of the Frelimo Party and its members. There is no 
separation of powers and interest between the party and the government. The functioning of 
the government is mediated through the party system, where every level of government is 
accountable to the party. MPs feel accountable to those that put their names on the party list 
and not the people in their constituency. Mozambicans, irrespective of their educational 
level, have no idea about the MPs that represent their constituency because they never 
selected them in their voting.  
 
Prospective candidates who want the party leadership to put their names on the party list will 
not join any collective action to demand accountability. The dominance of a single party in 
government since independence has given the impression that a change of government is 
impossible; hence voter participation is poor.  
 
Look at the low voter turnout rate in both presidential and parliamentary elections in 
the country? People are not interested in national election because they know the 
outcome will not make a difference.  
(Academics and researchers, FGD, Maputo, 13 March 2018) 
 
Table 5.5 Voter turnout in national elections 
 1999 2004 2009 2014 
Presidential   69.5 36.42 55.86 48.64 
Parliamentary 66.5 36.34 44.44 48.49 
Source: Election Guide 2018 
 
Within the Frelimo Party there are internal mechanisms that ensure individuals toe the party 
line. The thought that Frelimo could lose an election may help to promote SPA, but that 
appears a long shot in view of Frelimo’s embeddedness in every aspect of Mozambique’s 
economic, social and cultural fabric. Without the fear that citizens could vote out a ruling 
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government through the ballot box, Frelimo will pay no attention to ID. Frelimo’s dominance 
of the political space and over state and society leave the citizens with little space to embark 
on SPA.  
 
C4: Weak horizontal accountability between the executives, judiciary and legislature 
As a pro-accountability institution, a parliament has an important role to play in demanding 
accountability from the executive using ID, but the nature of the Mozambican Parliament 
does not allow it to serve that catalytic role. The ruling political party heads the Committee of 
Parliament that has responsibility to hold the executive accountable. As argued by a MP 
during the FGD, ‘the Parliament of Mozambique is designed to defend government more 
than providing checks and balances’.  
 
Since information on the ENI and ExxonMobil contract came to the public domain, I’ve 
asked for a debate on the contract and to understand how the supposed government 
revenue of US$350 million was arrived at. But for more than a year, the leadership of 
parliament has not scheduled this debate. The Frelimo party uses its majority to 
dominate parliament and manipulate discussions. The leadership of parliament is 
hesitant to bring issues that will make the government unpopular.  
(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018) 
 
Theoretically access to information can give us more power to monitor government but 
what we have in Mozambique is a weak parliament that is unable to hold the executive 
accountable.  
(MP, FGD, 15 March 2018) 
 
The Mozambican system of government where the President appoints about 80 per cent of 
the state officials works against promoting horizontal accountability. 
 
C5: Geographical spread of the country  
Mozambique is around the size of France and Germany combined. About 70 per cent of the 
population live in rural areas. Maputo, the nation’s capital and the seat of government, is 
located in the farthest south of the country, and away from the second and third largest 
populous provinces of Zambézia and Nampula located in the north. Maputo is delinked from 
the rest of urban and rural Mozambique and in general has more economic, social and 
political privileges. These differences have an effect on the way residents and institutions 
operate and react to ID and accountability. While the bulk of the extractive work occurs in the 
villages, sub-national governments have little power over mining companies that operate in 
the local jurisdictions. The central government (CG) ministries in Maputo make most of the 
mining decisions (Besharati 2012; MacKinnon 2013). The district administration though is 
closer to the communities; key information on mining contracts and distribution of revenue 
come from the CG in Maputo.  
 
In the FGD, researchers and academics estimated that only about 15 per cent of the 1.3 
million Maputo residents have formal sector jobs and enjoy urban livelihoods. The remaining 
85 per cent have livelihood conditions not dissimilar from the rural poor. Those who do go to 
the street to protest come from this poor 85 per cent, but their actions are not linked to or 
supported by the other educated and middle class 15 per cent. Moreover, the disconnect 
between the state administrative capital and the peripheries where the extractives occur 
means that SPA occurring in these rural areas is unable to bubble up to the centre because 
urban dwellers do not connect with the challenges of rural dwellers. In a context where the 
government is able to provide better services and livelihoods for those in the cities, urban 
dwellers are unlikely to back SPA in support of the predicaments of the rural population. 
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C6: Limited independent media 
The presence of an independent mass media to address coordination problems is key in 
persuading citizens to act (World Bank 2016; Overy 2010). Although improved in the last 
decade, the media landscape in Mozambique is still dominated by state-controlled outlets. 
The state run Rádio Moçambique is the most influential news outlet with the largest 
audience, offering programmes in 18 languages. The state-run television also has 
nationwide coverage with its programmes tilted in favour of the government, offering little 
opportunity for dissenting social and political views. Newspapers rarely print stories critical of 
the ruling party. State domination of traditional mass media makes it difficult to use that to 
advocate for SPA.  
 
The potential use of new media for mass mobilisation is limited; internet penetration in 
Maputo is 40 per cent, but for the remainder of the country it is only 6 per cent (Freedom 
House 2015). There is also a pervasive self-censorship among journalists and news outlets 
due to fear of the regime. For instance, in 2016, CIP developed a video on the implications 
of the hidden public debt to ordinary Mozambicans to be shown on ‘prime time TV news’. 
The TV station informed Frelimo party officials. CIP staff received threats from senior 
government officials after which the TV station refused to broadcast the message. Freedom 
House (2015) reports that political interference into media content occurs occasionally. 
Government censorship of community radio stations has been reported. For instance the 
Catholic radio in Nampula and many community radio broadcasters have been harassed, 
threatened and had their transmission suspended many times. 
  
C7: Pro-accountability institutions’ considerations in the context of conflict and 
fragility 
Mozambique is considered a post-conflict success country with substantial donor support. 
However, the extractive boom and prospects for mega projects have given concerns to 
donors, CSOs and analysts about the potential for a renewal of armed conflict between 
ruling Frelimo, and the former rebel movement and opposition party, Renamo (Frey 2016; 
Macuane et al. 2017). In July 2013, Renamo threatened to sabotage the mining operation by 
targeting its rail and road infrastructure. Renamo’s Party headquarters were also moved to 
the north where it enjoys greater support. In such a fragile context, CSOs and pro-
accountability organisations temper agitation for SPA with the need to avoid conflict and 
insecurity. As many of the CSOs from FGDs and interviews indicated, activism and agitation 
for SPA are carefully designed so that they do not become a security issue.  
 
… in such a fragile context where there is always a simmering conflict between 
Frelimo and Renamo, unguarded information disclosure can trigger serious conflict 
and potential escalation of the war. Fragile context matters because it shapes people’s 
unwillingness to take SPA.  
(Interview with a development partner, November 2017) 
 
5.4 Influence of external agencies to SPA for accountability 
In the context of weak endogenous capacity to pursue SPA, external agencies like 
development partners (donors) and international NGOs leverage government accountability 
using funding conditions and a threat of international sanctions. We identified two factors (D1 
and D2) that external agencies practice that lead to unintentional citizen and institutional 
inaction for accountability. 
 
D1: Substantial ODA contribution to the government budget is disincentive for 
upward accountability 
Donors have considerable influence on accountability in Mozambique because of the 
financial support they provide to the government budget (LeBillon 2013). Since 
32 
 
independence in 1975, ODA has contributed on average about 45 per cent of the state 
budget (Arndt et al. 2015). In 2004, aid accounted for 58 per cent of the government’s 
expenditure, though it reduced to 33.5 per cent in 2014 (Kirshner and Power 2015). It is now 
estimated to be about 36 per cent (World Bank 2018). Substantial ODA provides negative 
incentives for government to mobilise local tax, and citizens who do not pay tax have no 
incentive to demand upward accountability from the government. Tax revenue has fallen 
from 25.4 per cent in 2014 to 20 per cent in 2016. As tax revenue falls and extractive 
revenues rise, there is less incentive for people to mobilise for collective action and for the 
government to be sensitive to ID.  
 
D2: Inadequate external support to mobilising citizen consciousness, voice and 
action 
External agencies influence citizen voice and action through their funding of CSOs. The 
funding that is available influences what CSOs choose to do or not to do. In Mozambique, 
many CSOs are donor-created or would not exist without donor support (NORAD 2016: 27). 
With about half the population living below the national poverty line, it’s not surprising that 
more donor money goes into supporting service delivery and poverty alleviation than 
advocacy work. External support to Mozambican CSOs to develop citizen consciousness 
about the structural conditions that impoverish them and the need to collectively confront 
these structures through SPA is weak. Our analyses further show that where development 
partners have reacted strongly to reports of corruption, it has helped to amplify the voices of 
CSOs. For instance, all the FGD participants had heard about the US$2.2 million hidden 
public debt because it became a major public debate in the media and public gatherings 
when development partners withdrew financial support to the government. The involvement 
of donors made the information on the public debt too important to be ignored by the state 
media. According to many of the CSOs we interviewed, donors do not openly react to CIP 
and EITI reports for a number of reasons: commercial diplomacy due to some of the 
companies involved coming from their own countries; reservation about the veracity of the 
reports; or simply because they do not want to escalate an already fragile and conflict 
sensitive environment. 
 
If external support to CSOs is directed towards raising citizen awareness, voice and 
consciousness, we can begin to attack the structural causes of poverty in the country, 
which in my view are ignorance and corruption.  
(Interview with CSOs, Maputo, 11 March 2018) 
 
 
6  Summary of the analysis of the causal 
factors of SPI 
The analyses have shown that there are 17 factors that connect to effect citizen and 
institutional inaction for accountability. We found that when the technical nature and 
credibility of EITI and CIP reports on extractives ‘A1’ are connected with the mode of 
dissemination of the reports ‘A2’, the elite groups in Maputo that the reports target ‘A3’ and 
the fact that those reports rarely suggest specific citizen or institutional action for 
accountability ‘A4’; then the quality of ID provides insufficient persuasiveness to trigger a 
chain reaction - comprehension, action, and the response of citizens and pro-accountability 
institutions as Fung et al. (2004: 9) suggest. EITI and CIP information disclosure does not 
reach the provinces, mining communities, pro-accountability institutions and the wider public 
to trigger SPA. 
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When the quality of the reports (written in English and Portuguese and disseminated on 
organisational websites and during news conferences) is connected with citizens’ high levels 
of illiteracy ‘B1’, economic vulnerability and poverty ‘B2’, disbelief of their capacity to take 
action ‘B3’, and the poor mobilisation efforts of CSOs ‘B4’ in a context of structural and 
institutional constraint – a ‘culture of submissiveness ‘C1’, fear of the political regime ‘C2’, 
the dominance of a single political party that controls access to economic opportunities ‘C3’, 
a weak constraint on government ‘C4’, wide geographical spread of the country such that the 
poor socio-economic conditions of mining communities do not arouse sympathy and reaction 
from elites in Maputo ‘C5’; then it is extremely hard to expect endogenous initiatives of SPA 
to arise. The only remedy left is SPA that is facilitated by exogenous actors. Here also the 
analysis shows that the substantial ODA that is provided through government budget 
support ‘D1’ and inadequate external support to mobilising citizen consciousness, voice and 
action ‘D2’ seem to constrain SPA. With the support of informants and participants at the 
FGDs and workshops, we have connected each of the 17 contributing factors into a network 
chart as shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
There was absolute consensus among the 61 FGD participants that no single factor causes 
SPI but together they combine to cause citizen and pro-accountability institution inaction. 
Table 6.1 below shows how focus groups ranked the contributing factors into a top three. A 
score of 1 means the most significant obstacle to SPA for accountability and 3 the least. 
 
Table 6.1 Focus groups’ ranking of contributing factors of SPI 
Focus group 
 
Ranking of the causes of citizens and institutions’ 
inaction for government accountability 
C3  B1 C1  B2  B4 C6 C5 
Researchers and academics 1 3 - 2  - - 
Community leaders 3 1 - - 2 - - 
Provincial CSOs  - 1 2 3 - - - 
CSOs in Maputo 1 - 2 - 3 - - 
Members of Parliament 2 - 1 - - 3 - 
Provincial Government Officers - 1 3 2 - - - 
Women’s groups 1 - 2 - - - 3 
Urban youth - 1 - 2 - 3 - 
Notes: 
B1:  Citizen high levels of illiteracy and inadequate civic values  
B2:  High levels of economic vulnerability and poverty  
B4:  CSOs’ inability to mobilise citizens  
C1:  Culture of ‘submissiveness’ (devoid of confrontation and activism)  
C3:  Dominance of a single party and the nature of political representation (party list) 
C5:  Wide geographical spread of the country 
C6:  Limited independent media (state centred and private self-censorship)  
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Figure 6.1 Summary of the 17 connecting factors that lead to SPI for accountability in extractive governance in Mozambique 
Source: Authors’ own.
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From the perspective of researchers/academics, CSOs in Maputo and women’s groups in 
the provincial capital, the main obstacle to SPA is the nature of politics and the dominance of 
a single party in Mozambique. There was consensus among the women’s groups that 
without reforming the way politics works; none of the transparency initiatives by EITI and CIP 
can lead to SPA for accountability and good governance in the country.  
 
People fear the government. Even if we know that we’re right, we cannot act because 
we’re afraid of the political regime. We need real democracy that people can talk and 
demonstrate without being worried about the consequences. The majority of the MPs 
are representing the Frelimo Party in parliament and not the people.  
(Consensus of women’s groups, FGD, Pemba, 21 March 2018) 
 
On the other hand; community members, provincial government officers, and the urban 
youth think it is ‘B1’: ‘low level of citizen literacy, consciousness and civic values’ that is the 
main cause of SPI.  
 
Generally SPA arising from ID is rare or at best episodic in Mozambique. CIP and other 
CSOs shared a few instances where micro-level actions have resulted in positive 
accountability from private corporations but this had nothing to do with ID by EITI, CIP or the 
MSG. For instance, in June 2015, CTV took court action against US oil and gas company 
Anadarko and the GoM over the installation of an on-shore gas processing plant without 
adequate consultation, compensation and resettlement of over 5,000 people from the Afungi 
Peninsula. CTV contested the project on the basis that the communities had not been 
consulted and that the legal process and people’s land rights had not been respected. 
Anadarko and the Mozambican state initially deployed authoritarian tactics to intimidate CTV 
staff and associates. The government accused CTV of sabotaging the project, leading to 
police arrest and detention of the organisation’s leaders (Symons 2016: 156). The legal 
challenge compelled Anadarko to commit more resources into community development. It 
earmarked US$180 million as compensation for the community and an additional US$90,000 
for social infrastructure such as homes, schools, hospitals and access roads (Macauhub/MZ 
2015). Anadarko claimed that the compensation amounted to about US$36,000 per person 
in the Afungi community. If this commitment was delivered, this would have been a major 
impact but CSOs claim that so far the promises have not been fulfilled. To date only the first 
eight households have been resettled.  
 
Varied stakeholders have testified that as a result of EITI there have been improvements in 
dialogue between the government and CSOs in the sector, though CIP is critical that the 
dialogue is superficial, as the ability of CSOs to influence government intentions or reduce 
conflict of interest is limited. CIP criticises the government’s commitment to the MSG, citing 
several instances where low-level public officers represented the government in the group’s 
meetings. Some of CIP’s criticisms are also alluded to in the MEITI 2017 validation report. In 
the wake of donor withdrawal of budget support, the government’s commitment to the EITI 
process has declined. By the end of 2017, the World Bank funding of the national secretariat 
of EITI had ended and the GoM indicated it was not in a position to fund the secretariat in 
the same way. For instance the GoM cannot pay the same salaries that the World Bank give 
staff. Since August 2017, CIP has ceased to be a member of the MSG after its two-year term 
elapsed. Two new organisations based in the provinces, Associacao de Apoio e Assistencia 
Juridica as Comunidades (AAAJC) from Tete Province and AENA from Nampula have joined 
the MSG.  
 
6.1 Can ID promote accountability and inclusive development without SPA? 
Reflecting on the EITI theory of change and multiple paths to accountability as shown in 
Figure 1.1, there appears to be evidence that seems to suggest that MSG dialogue can 
promote accountability without necessarily taking the long route of SPA by citizens and pro-
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accountability institutions. The MEITI, CIP and other CSOs claim that their ID work to MPs 
has contributed to the development and revision of the Petroleum and Mining Laws (Law 
20/2014; Law 21/2014) and subsequent amendments. The Law 20/2014 includes Article 8.4 
that requires publication of all contracts within 30 days of signing. The Mineral Resources 
and Energy Ministry (MIREME) has followed up on this standard and published some of the 
active extractive contracts on its website.10 But in general, there is weak enforcement of the 
laws and regulations governing the extractive sector (EITI 2017: 7). While the EITI standard 
may have informed the law on subnational transfers, up until now, the GoM has not 
developed any strategy for ensuring that the 2.75 per cent royalties due to communities are 
actually implemented in accordance with the law. Yet there has been little SPA from CSOs, 
MEITI or CIP to compel the government to account for the money. 
 
Since Mozambique joined the EITI in 2009, public perception of corruption in the country has 
not seen an appreciable reduction. With a global average score of 4.3,11 Mozambique’s 
corruption perception index (CPI) ranks among the highest in the world, as is its Mo Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance (IIAG) ranking (see Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.2 Mozambique governance index  
Mozambique 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
CPI 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.5 
IIAG overall 53.8 55.0 54.2 53.9 53.5 52.1 52.1 52.3 52.2 NA 
Note: NA = not available. 
Source: Compiled from Transparency International and IIAG Reports.  
 
The presumption that ID on government corruption would have a negative effect on private 
sector investment did not seem obvious from discussions with the mining companies. 
Anadarko did not indicate that the revelation of the US$2.2 billion in hidden public debt or 
CIP’s revelation of Sasol’s shady contract would in any way affect their projected LPG 
investment in Mozambique, although its representative hinted that premium consumers in 
Japan and Singapore do take corruption and other governance issues into consideration in 
their business transactions.  
 
In the early stages of commercial exploitation of natural resources, the GoM and mining 
communities had high expectations that international investment would create wealth and 
turn the economy and people’s livelihoods around. But as large-scale exploitation has taken 
place, reality is beginning to dawn on people that they may not receive the benefits of 
extractive revenue after all. Discussions in the FGDs show that infrastructure development 
around mining communities has not shown appreciable improvement above those 
communities without the benefit of natural resources. The physical, social, and economic 
lives of the people in the mining communities are disconnected from the international capital 
invested in extractive resources. The poverty conditions of the small towns around the gas 
project are described as a tragedy, particularly when multi-billion mining investments such as 
that of Sasol provide very little in return to these poor communities (Whittles 2017; 
Hlatshaneni 2017). So the presumption that ID and MSG dialogue can lead to improved 
governance and inclusive development without SPA may be difficult to sustain in the 
Mozambique context. The fact that private companies hardly attend MSG meetings in 
Mozambique and prefer instead to have bilateral engagement with the GoM because they 
cast doubt on the appropriateness of the MSG platform to address their concerns (EITI 
2017: 22) supports our conclusion that without SPA, accountability is weak in the EITI 
process. 
                                                          
10  www.mireme.gov.mz/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=8&Itemid=160.  
11  A score closer to zero shows a high level of corruption while closer to 10 means the country is very clean. 
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7  Conclusions and policy implications 
7.1 Conclusions 
The EITI has provided opportunities for multiple stakeholders (CSOs, the government, and 
private corporations) to be involved in ID and transparency initiatives in extractive 
governance in Mozambique. The presumed chain of actions that ID, when it exposes 
corruption in extractive governance, will trigger, such as civic interrogation of political 
leaders, public protest and further investigation stimulating policy debate, court action, and 
enforcement and/or legislative review, return of stolen extractive revenue and imprisonment 
of corrupt public officials and their associates, has rarely happened in Mozambique. This 
study has identified 17 factors that inter-connect to produce citizen and institutional inaction 
on accountability. The study shows that when information on ‘corrupt’ extractive governance 
is connected with citizens’ high levels of economic vulnerability and illiteracy; the presence of 
a dominant political party with structures that permeate all aspects of state and non-state 
institutions; an institutional culture of ‘submissiveness’ that has been created out of fear of 
the political regime and media self-censorship; and weak CSO capacity to mobilise citizens, 
then Mozambicans, their parliament, revenue agencies and public prosecutors are unlikely 
to take action to demand accountability from the government. 
 
Without efforts to improve the economic empowerment of citizens, ID will not trigger SPA. In 
Mozambique, those who earn a regular and reliable income often work in the public sector or 
in private firms linked to the government. Without economic independence from the ruling 
government, it is unrealistic to expect people to pursue SPA against the government that 
provides them access to economic opportunities. Economic vulnerability also works against 
the ability of public officers to use ID from CSOs to trigger traditional accountability 
mechanisms such as investigations, inspections, audits, arrest and prosecution. The 
Attorney General will not act; the police will not act; public prosecutors will not act because 
people need to protect their jobs, incomes and security.  
 
Hence the theory of change presented earlier does not work in Mozambique because of the 
17 factors. Despite signing up to EITI, the GoM continues to act with impunity in the face of 
ID, which elsewhere might bring many governments down. The consequences of such 
accountability failures are enormous. This includes worsening levels of corruption, failure to 
enforce routine mining legislation, and non-inclusivity of economic growth. These outcomes 
are not unusual in many natural resource-rich but poor countries, for example Angola, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria, where the physical, social, and economic lives 
of the people that live in extractive communities are disconnected from the international 
capital invested in the sector.   
 
In Mozambique the nature of politics and the political regime have been key contributing 
factors to accountability failures. Since 1994, the ruling political party (Frelimo) has won all 
democratic elections. The fusion of the political party and state structures coupled with the 
centralisation of powers in the hands of party elites provide a framework in which citizens 
and pro-accountability institutions are unable to pursue actions to demand accountability. 
This context coupled with state control of the economy and social services, means citizens 
depend on the magnanimity of the party-state for survival. The patron-client relationship that 
the Frelimo party has with its members provides them with economic benefits and access to 
state resources in exchange for political support (Macuane et al. 2017). Without the 
understanding that citizens can vote them out through the ballot box, governments will pay 
no attention to ID. 
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7.2 Implications of the study findings on policies and practices on transparency 
initiatives 
With a high level of public debt arising from corruption, and the expectation that extractive 
resources could be used clandestinely to defray the debt, transparency and accountability 
initiatives in the extractive sector would require a recalibration of strategies to make them 
successful. Based on the findings of this study, we offer the following policy and practice 
suggestions to EITI, PWYP, CSOs, international NGOs and development agencies that 
support ID as a mechanism for promoting accountability: 
 
 Poor mining communities have the greatest interest in using information on corrupt 
mining contracts to pursue SPA, but they are the least targeted with ID. In 
Mozambique and other resource-rich but poor countries, information on corrupt mining 
contracts reach only the urban elites who benefit disproportionally from extractive 
revenue through better infrastructure service provision, hence their interest in 
collective action following ID is weak.  
 Protagonists of ID and accountability initiatives such as EITI, PWYP, CIP, etc. need to 
go beyond ID and consider how they can support interest groups and institutions to 
take action. It is not enough to disclose information in a context where ‘naming and 
shaming’ does not deter shameless people from abusing power and state resources. It 
is not enough for EITI to disclose information that the government has not been 
transparent on extractive revenue or a government’s royalty transfers to communities 
do not match specific legal requirements, or, that a proportion of extractive revenue 
cannot be traced to any government account. Supporters of ID could also inform (and 
train) key stakeholders on what action they need to take to ensure that a government 
fulfils its legal obligations. External agencies need to facilitate weak endogenous 
actors in focusing attention on citizen mobilisation instead of assuming that information 
itself will mobilise collective action. Information does not mobilise action, interest 
groups do. 
 Conscientisation, civic awareness campaigns and economic empowerment are the 
first steps for promoting government accountability. Though literacy levels may be low 
in many resource-rich but poor countries, other forms of education such as citizen civic 
awareness and consciousness will be critical first steps to move ID to real 
empowerment. Without inculcating in citizens public interest values, ID as a means to 
holding government accountable is less effective or meaningless. External support to 
CSOs on developing citizen consciousness about the structural conditions that 
impoverish them and the need to collectively confront these structures is needed. 
Additionally, in fragile contexts, ID initiatives must go hand in hand with strategies to 
improve citizens’ economic livelihoods. Economic advocacy may be needed to 
complement policy advocacy. 
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